Ecosystem management via interacting models of political and ecological processes by Haas, T. C.
231 Animal Biodiversity and Conservation 27.1 (2004)
© 2004 Museu de Ciències Naturals ISSN: 1578–665X
Haas, T. C., 2004. Ecosystem management via interacting models of political and ecological processes.
Animal Biodiversity and Conservation, 27.1: 231–245.
Abstract
Ecosystem management via interacting models of political and ecological processes.— The decision to
implement environmental protection options is a political one. Political realities may cause a country to not
heed the most persuasive scientific analysis of an ecosystem’s future health. A predictive understanding of the
political processes that result in ecosystem management decisions may help guide ecosystem management
policymaking. To this end, this article develops a stochastic, temporal model of how political processes
influence and are influenced by ecosystem processes. This model is realized in a system of interacting
influence diagrams that model the decision making of a country’s political bodies. These decisions interact with
a model of the ecosystem enclosed by the country. As an example, a model for Cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus)
management in Kenya is constructed and fitted to decision and ecological data.
Key words: Social systems, Ecological systems, Influence diagrams.
Resumen
Gestión de ecosistemas mediante modelos interactivos de procesos políticos y ecológicos.— La decisión de
implementar opciones de protección medioambiental es de carácter político. Las realidades políticas de un
país pueden permitir ignorar los análisis científicos más rotundos acerca de la futura salud de un
ecosistema. Una comprensión predictiva de los procesos políticos que conducen a la toma de decisiones
sobre la gestión de los ecosistemas puede contribuir a orientar las políticas relativas a dichas áreas. Con
este objetivo, el presente artículo desarrolla un modelo estocástico temporal acerca de cómo los procesos
políticos influyen y son influidos por los procesos de los ecosistemas. Dicho modelo se ha estructurado a
partir de un sistema de diagramas de influencia interactivos que configuran la toma de decisiones de las
instituciones políticas de un país. Dichas decisiones interactúan con un modelo del ecosistema presente en
el país. Así, a modo de ejemplo, se elabora un modelo para la gestión del guepardo (Acinonyx jubatus) en
Kenia, ajustándose a los datos ecológicos y de toma de decisiones.
Palabras clave: Sistemas sociales, Sistemas ecológicos, Diagramas de influencia.
Timothy C. Haas, School of Business Administration, Univ. of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, P. O. Box 742,
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them achieve these goals. This view of the policy
making process is particularly relevant for studying
wildlife management in developing countries: as
Gibson (1999, pp. 9–10) states "New institutional-
ists provide tools useful to the study of African
wildlife policy by placing individuals, their prefer-
ences, and institutions at the center of analysis.
They begin with the assumption that individuals are
rational, self–interested actors who attempt to se-
cure the outcome they most prefer. Yet, as these
actors search for gains in a highly uncertain world,
their strategic interactions may generate subopti-
mal outcomes for society as a whole. Thus, rational
individuals can take actions that lead to irrational
social outcomes." New institutionalism is not lim-
ited to explaining ecosystem management
policymaking in developing countries. Healy &
Ascher (1995) document the effect that individual
actor goal seeking behavior had on how analytical
ecosystem health models were used to manage
national forests in the United States during the
1970s, ’80s, and ’90s.
Another paradigm for political decision making
is the descriptive model (see Vertzberger, 1990).
This approach emphasizes that humans can only
reach decisions based on their internal, perceived
models of other actors in the decision making
situation. These internal models may in fact be
inaccurate portrayals of the capabilities and inten-
tions of these other actors.
The ecosystem model component of the EMS
described in Haas (2001) can be extended to syn-
thesize these two policy making paradigms. In Haas
(2001), the ecosystem model is expressed as an
influence diagram (ID) (see the online tutorial, Haas
(2003b) for an introduction to IDs). To incorporate
the interaction between groups and the ecosystem,
a set of IDs are constructed, one for each group,
and one for the ecosystem. Then, optimal decisions
computed by each of these group IDs through time
are allowed to interact with the solution history of
the ecosystem ID. The model that emerges from
the interactions of the group IDs and the ecosystem
ID is called an interacting influence diagrams (IntIDs)
model. In this model, each group makes decisions
that they perceive will further their individual goals.
Each of these groups however, has a perceived,
possibly inaccurate internal model of the ecosys-
tem and the other groups. The IntIDs model ap-
proach then, synthesizes insights from political eco-
nomics (groups acting to maximize their own utility
functions) and descriptive decision making theory
(groups using —possibly— distorted internal mod-
els of other groups to reach decisions).
By choosing from a pre–determined repertoire of
options, each group implements the option that
maximizes a multiobjective (multiple goals) utility
function. This is accomplished by having each
group’s ID contain a decision option node repre-
senting the different actions that the group can
take. Each group has an overall goal satisfaction
node (hereafter, a utility node) that is influenced by
the group’s goals. Each group implements an op-
Introduction
Ultimately, the decision to implement ecosystem
protection policies is a political one. Currently, the
majority of ecosystem management research is
concerned with ecological and/or physical proc-
esses. A management option that is suggested by
examining the output of these models and/or data
analyses may not be implemented unless the op-
tion addresses the goals of each involved social
group (hereafter, group).
For example, Francis & Regier (1995) describe
efforts to sustain the Great Lakes ecosystem. These
authors identify the following major barriers to the
sustainable management of this ecosystem:
1. Social science research and model building is
restricted by research funding decisions to "safe"
projects – typically the economic benefits of Great
Lakes resource utilization. These authors see a
strong need for social science research to under-
stand the goals and restrictions that drive the many
groups that advise, regulate, pollute, and advocate
for the Great Lakes ecosystem.
2. Great Lakes physical and biological science is
University department compartmentalized and hence
ecosystem models that integrate limnological and
terrestrial subsystems are under–developed.
3. Because of (2), science–based management
policies are lacking in their reliability and hence are
either ignored, corrupted or, at best have limited
impact during the political process of negotiating
treaties between Canada and the U.S. for the regu-
lation of pollution, fishing, and recreation on the
Great Lakes.
As a step towards meeting these needs, an
Ecosystem Management System (EMS) is described
herein that links political processes and goals to
ecosystem processes and ecosystem health goals.
This system is used to identify first the set of
ecosystem management policies that have a realis-
tic chance of being accepted by all involved groups,
and then, within this set, those policies that are
most beneficial to the ecosystem. Haas (2001)
gives one way of defining the main components,
workings, and delivery of an EMS. The central
component of this EMS is a quantitative, stochastic,
and causal model of the ecosystem being managed
(hereafter, the EMS model). The other components
are (2) links to data streams, (3) freely–available
software for performing all ecosystem management
computations and displays, and (4) a web–based
archive and delivery system for items 1–3.
This article focuses on ecosystem management
in developing countries. One of the first questions
then, is what theoretical framework should be used
to model political groups in developing countries?
The "new institutionalists" (see Gibson 1999, pp. 9–
14, 163, 169–171; Brewer & De Leon, 1983;
Lindblom, 1980) draw on political economy theory
to stress the following: (a) decision makers are
pursuing their own personal goals, e.g. increasing
their influence and protecting their job; and (b)
decision makers work to modify institutions to helpAnimal Biodiversity and Conservation 27.1 (2004) 233
tion that maximizes the expected value of its utility
node. This is called evaluating the ID (see Nilsson
& Lauritzen, 2000). A schematic of the architecture
of an IntIDs model is given in figure 1.
As new types of actions are observed, the fixed
repertoire of actions is periodically enlarged and
the EMS model is re–fitted to the entire set of
actions observations —see the Parameter Estima-
tion with CA section, below.
Ecosystem management emerges as each group
implements management actions that best satisfy
its goals conditional on the actions of the other
groups and the ecosystem’s status. Conditional on
these implemented management options, the mar-
ginal distributions of all ecosystem status variables
are updated. By simulating these between–group
and group–to–ecosystem interactions many years
into the future, predictions of future ecosystem
status can be computed.
Ecosystem status, state, or health (hereafter
status) is a multidimensional concept and has been
defined differently depending on those ecosystem
characteristics of most interest to the analyst. This
article focuses on the status of an endangered
species within an ecosystem. One way to quantify
this characteristic is with the number of animals of
such a species in the ecosystem at a particular
spatio–temporal point.
Kelly & Durant (2000) identify the cheetah in
East Africa as an endangered species. The exam-
ple given below of cheetah survivability in Kenya
contains count variables for cheetah, and cheetah
prey (herbivores having a biomass less than 35 kg).
Future extensions of this model will have variables
for individual cheetah prey herbivores such as
Thomson’s gazelle.
An output of the EMS model is the probability
distribution on each of these counts by region and
time point. These distributions are used to compute
a typical measure of species survivability: the prob-
ability of extinction (POE) defined as the chance of
a non–sustainable cheetah count at a specified
spatial location and future point in time.
The uses and benefits of an EMS that combines
both political and ecological processes are: (1) a
(possibly empty) set of ecosystem management poli-
cies can be found that are both politically acceptable
and effective at protecting the ecosystem; (2) the
most likely sequence of future management activi-
ties can be identified so that more plausible predic-
tions of future ecosystem status can be computed
such as extinction probabilities; and (3) international
audiences can predict which countries have any
chance of reaching ecosystem status goals such as
averting the extinction of an endangered species.
Because this modeling effort draws on several
disciplines, the goals that are driving the model’s
development need to be clearly stated. They are (in
order of priority):
1. Usability: develop a model that, because of its
predictive and construct validity, contributes to the
ecosystem management debate by delivering reli-
able insight into how groups reach ecosystem man-
agement decisions, what strategies are effective in
influencing these decisions, and how ecosystems
respond to management actions.
2. Clarity and accessibility: develop a model that
can be exercised and understood by as wide a
range of users as possible. Such users will mini-
mally need to be literate and have either direct
access to the EMS website or access to a printed
copy of the EMS report. For the cheetah viability
example below, all groups except rural residents
and pastoralists meet these minimum requirements.
A major challenge will be to bring the contents of
the EMS report to groups that are illiterate and/or
lack web access. One idea is to deliver the EMS
report to any literate members of such groups, e.g.
schoolteachers.
There is a tension between predictive and con-
struct validity in that the development of a model
rich enough in structure to represent theories of
group decision making and ecosystem dynamics
can easily become overparameterized which in–turn
can reduce its predictive performance. The approach
taken here is to develop as simple a model as is
faithful to theories of group decision making and
ecosystem dynamics —followed by a fit of this
model to data so as to maximize its predictive
performance. Specifically, success in the model build-
ing effort presented herein will be measured along
the following two dimensions: (1) the model’s one–
Fig. 1. Schematic of the IntIDs model of
interacting political and ecological processes.
Fig. 1. Diagrama esquemático del modelo de
IntIDs (diagramas de influencia interactivos)
para los procesos interactivos de carácter
ecológico y político.
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step–ahead prediction error rate wherein at every
step, the model is refitted with all available data up
to that step; and (2) the degree to which the model’s
internal structure (variables and inter–variable rela-
tionships) agrees with theories of group behavior
and ecology/population dynamics theories. The first
dimension measures predictive validity and the sec-
ond, construct validity.
One step ahead predictive validity is seen as
essential to establishing the reliability of the EMS
model. Such predictive validity is however, not
without its challenges. For example, it is possible
that once an EMS model becomes known to the
groups it is modeling, these groups may alter their
behavior in response to model predictions. This
Heisenberg Principle effect would invalidate model
predictions.
The influence of groups attempting to game
EMS model predictions could be represented in the
EMS model by adding another group called "the
modelers." This group would post EMS model pre-
dictions to the bulletin board at every time step for
all other groups to read. Once evidence on how
model predictions are gamed is observed, such
gaming behavior could be included in the group
submodels of the EMS model and one step ahead
prediction error rates computed as described in the
Results section, below. Of course a second level of
gaming is possible wherein groups attempt to ma-
nipulate an EMS model that includes groups at-
tempting to game EMS model predictions. This
second level of a Heisenberg Principle effect would
be difficult to correct for and no solution is offered
at this time.
This article proceeds as follows. The Materials
and methods section gives the architecture of a
group ID. The Results section applies this frame-
work to the management of cheetah in Kenya and
describes how the model can be statistically fitted
to observations on political and ecosystem vari-
ables represented in the model. Conclusions are
drawn in the Discussion section along with brief
comparisons with related efforts.
Materials and methods
Group ID architecture
Overview
A group’s ID is partitioned into subsets of con-
nected nodes called the Situation, and Scenario
subIDs (see figure 2 in Haas 2003a, Section 2).
The Situation subID is the group’s internal repre-
sentation of the state of the decision situation and
contains Situation state nodes. Conditional on what
decision option is chosen, the Scenario subID is the
group’s internal representation of what the future
situation (the Scenario) will be like after a proposed
option is implemented. See Haas (1992, 2003a) for
the cognitive theory that supports this decision
making model architecture.
Actors, actions, and the time node
A decision option will hereafter be referred to as an
action. Groups interact with each other and the
ecosystem by executing actions. The decision mak-
ing group, referred to as the DM_group receives an
input action that is executed by an actor referred to
as the input–action–actor group or InAc_group. The
subject of this action is the input–action–subject
group or InS_group (which may or may not be the
DM_group). The DM_group implements an output
action whose subject is the target group or T_group.
Actions are either verbal (message) or physical events
that include all inter– and intra–country interactions.
Each ID is a dynamic model and therefore has a
deterministic root node Time. Time starts at t0 and
increments discretely through t1, ..., tT in steps of  t.
Ecosystem status perceptions nodes
Quantities that represent ecosystem status can be
input nodes to a group ID. These nodes influence a
node that represents how sensitive the group is to
the value of the corresponding ecosystem status
node. The idea is that a group is affected by the
ecosystem but is only conscious of it through fil-
tered, perceptual functions of the underlying eco-
system status nodes. For example, a group ID is
sensitive to the presence of a land animal such as
the cheetah through the animal’s density (number
per hectare). This sensitivity is modeled by having
the animal’s density node influence a perceived
animal prevalence node that takes on the values
none, few, and many.
An ecosystem status node is stochastic due to it
being a component of a stochastic ecosystem model.
Sources of noise within this model include climate,
unmodeled or mismodeled ecological functions, and
inaccurate specification of model parameters.
Even if an ecosystem status node was determin-
istic, how values on this node would affect the
representation of the ecosystem quantity in a group’s
perception of the ecosystem has its own set of
uncertainties and noise sources. For example, con-
sider the size of a minority population in a city. A
demographic model allows for the stochasticity in
birth rates, death rates, migration, and emigration.
Now consider an elderly member of this city who’s
only source of information is TV news and newslet-
ters from politically conservative groups. The per-
ceived size of the minority population of the city by
this elderly person may be only minimally affected
by the probability distribution of this quantity com-
puted from the demographic model. Further, this
elderly person may reason about the size of this
minority population in categorical terms (small, mod-
erate, hordes). The credence this individual will give
to these different values will be determined in–part
by random encounters with members of this minority
group (captured by the demographic model) and by
some noisy function of images viewed on TV and
statements made in newsletters ("...members of mi-
nority group X are over–running this city!").Animal Biodiversity and Conservation 27.1 (2004) 235
Therefore, a separate node within each group ID
is seen as necessary to capture both the more
coarse resolution of perceptual models of continu-
ously–valued quantities and the unique sources of
stochasticity characteristic of perceptual processing.
Image nodes
A set of dimensions that defines the DM_group’s
image of another group is needed. Two such dimen-
sions, Affect and Relative Power appear in many
studies of political belief systems. Affect varies over
the  enemy–neutral–ally–self dimension (Murray &
Cowden, 1999; Hudson, 1983, chs. 2–4). Relative
Power varies over the weaker–parity–stronger dimen-
sion. The Affect dimension’s self category is needed
because the subject of an InAc_group’s action may
be the DM_group itself. This self category includes
the DM_group’s audiences (see below).
Economic, militaristic and institutional goals
This model is based on the cognitive–theoretic as-
sumption that a group evaluates an input action
directly on its perceived immediate and future im-
pacts on economic, militaristic, and institutional goals.
The two militaristic goals of Defend Country (inter–
country), and Maintain Domestic Order (intra–coun-
try) are lumped into one Militaristic goal node.
Economic and militaristic goal status is computed
with a two–step process: first an assessment is made
of how the input or output action changes economic
or military resource amounts; then, an assessment is
made of how these new resource levels affect the
associated economic or militaristic goal.
Here, only one institutional goal is modeled:
Maintain Political Power. This goal is solely de-
pendent on maintaining the contentment of several
important audiences, discussed below.
A goal node is a binary–valued random variable
with values not–satisfied and satisfied. A goal node
is similar to a utility variable in political economics.
The nodes that affect these utility judgements are
the DM_group’s InAc_group and InS_group image
nodes, and the nodes representing the input ac-
tion’s immediate and future impact on the
DM_group’s resources.
Scenario goals are influenced by Situation goals
—if an output action does not cause a resource or
audience node change, the Scenario goal’s distri-
bution is the same as the corresponding Situation
goal’s distribution.
Audience effects
The influence of audiences on a decision maker is
described by research that suggests perceptions of
present and future reactions of important audiences
have effects on decision making and bargaining,
see Asch (1951), Festinger (1957), Milgram (1974),
Rubin & Brown (1975), and Partell & Palmer (1999).
An input action’s impact on an audience is modeled
as a function of the action’s perceived effect on
audience demands. For example, an important au-
dience for (former) President Moi of Kenya was his
ethnic group, the Kalenjin (Throup & Hornsby, 1998,
p. 8). President Moi knew that only actions that
brought benefits to that group would be favorably
received by them.
The effects of perceived audience reactions to
input actions is modeled by having input action
characteristics influence Audience Demands Satis-
faction Change nodes which in turn, influence Audi-
ence Contentment nodes. What demands an audi-
ence has and the effect of different input actions on
the satisfaction of those demands are both repre-
sented by the conditional distributions of the Audi-
ence Demands Satisfaction Change nodes.
Say that the DM_group ID has k important
audiences and consider the ith such audience. Let
the node CAi
(St) denote the perceived change in
audience i’s demands satisfaction level due to an
input action. CAi
(St) takes on the values decreased,
no change, and increased. Let the node Ai
(St) de-
note the perceived contentment level of audience
i. Ai
(St) takes on the values discontented, and con-
tented. Likewise, in the Scenario subID, output
action characteristics influence Audience Content-
ment nodes through the Audience Demands Satis-
faction Change nodes. These nodes are also influ-
enced by input action characteristics.
Situation contentment level influences Scenario
contentment: if there is no change to an audience’s
contentment level due to the output action, Sce-
nario contentment level inherits the Situation’s con-
tentment level.
The only goal node influenced by audience con-
tentment nodes is the Maintain Political Power goal,
GMPP
(St) —there is no goal of directly satisfying audi-
ences because the decision maker has no concern
for these audiences other than how they affect the
decision maker’s hold on political power.
Overall goal satisfaction
Goal prioritization is modeled by a single node
representing the DM_group’s overall sense of well–
being. This node, denoted by U(St) (Situation) or
U(Sc) (Scenario) is a deterministic function of the
goal nodes wherein the coefficients in this function
are interpreted as goal–importance weights and
hence are assigned from knowledge of the group’s
goal priorities.
Group actions
To avoid creating a system that can only process a
historical sequence of ecosystem management ac-
tions, a group output action classification system is
needed that characterizes actions along dimen-
sions that are not situation–specific. The idea is to
map an exhaustive list of possible actions onto a
set of dimensions that collectively completely de-
scribe an action. Several action taxonomies or
classification systems have been developed in the
political science literature (see Schrodt, 1995). These236 Haas
taxonomies however, lack a set of situation–inde-
pendent dimensions for characterizing an action.
The approach taken here is to base a set of action
characteristics or dimensions on an existing action
classification system. The Behavioral Correlates of
War (BCOW) classification system is chosen for
this extension for two reasons. First, BCOW is
designed to support a variety of theoretical view-
points (Leng, 1999) and hence can be used to code
data that will be used to estimate a model of group
decision making that synthesizes realist and cogni-
tive processing paradigms of political decision mak-
ing —and BCOW is at least as rich a classification
system as other systems in the literature. Second,
BCOW has coding slots for recording: (i) a detailed
description of an action, (ii) inter– and intra–coun-
try groups, and (iii) a short history of group interac-
tions. This last coding category allows causal rela-
tionships to be identified and tracked through time.
The BCOW coding scheme consists of a nearly
exhaustive list of actions grouped into Military, Dip-
lomatic, Economic, Unofficial (intra–country actor),
and Verbal categories. The BCOW classification
system exhaustively and uniquely characterizes a
verbal action into either a comment on an action
(Verbal: Action Comment), a statement that an
action is intended (Verbal: Action Intent), or a re-
quest for an action (Verbal: Action Request).
Modifications have been made to the BCOW
scheme for purposes of categorizing ecosystem
management actions. These modifications are as
follows. First, the Unofficial Actions category of the
BCOW coding system is not needed since groups
internal to a country are modeled as having nearly
the same range of output actions as a country–
level group. Hence, all BCOW Unofficial Actions
have been absorbed into one of the other action
categories. For example, Hostage Taking, BCOW
code 14153 is coded as a Military dimension ac-
tion. Second, all BCOW Verbal Actions have been
inserted into the BCOW Diplomatic Action cat-
egory. Third, because BCOW does not include
many actions that are peculiar to ecosystem man-
agement, such actions have been added to the
BCOW taxonomy at the end of each action cat-
egory listing (see Appendix 1, tables A1–A3 at
www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/bcow.pdf).
See Haas (2003a) for descriptions of nodes that
determine realistic actor–input action combinations,
and realistic target–output action combinations.
A proposed target and output action combination
influences target image and action characteristic
nodes. These nodes along with Situation goal nodes,
influence Scenario goal nodes. Finally, Scenario
goal nodes influence the Scenario Overall Goal
Satisfaction node. Each target and output action
combination is used to compute the expected value
of the Overall Goal Satisfaction node. At time t, the
output action that maximizes this expected value is
designated by coptimal(t).
After determining coptimal(t), the DM_group posts
to a bulletin board an action–message consisting of
the time, the DM_group’s name, the target’s name,
and the BCOW action code. At the next time value,
all other groups read this message. Each group
assigns the values on the action characteristics
associated with the BCOW action code and as-
signs values to the InAc_group image and InS_group
image nodes. Using these values, each group com-
putes an optimal output action and posts it to the
bulletin board. When all groups have posted an
output action and the ecosystem ID has posted
updated distributions on its status nodes, the time
variable is incremented by the value of  t and the
process is repeated (see fig.  2). Note that this
protocol allows for feedback loops through time to
emerge without need for additional model structure.
There are groups that directly affect the ecosys-
tem and groups that only indirectly affect the eco-
system. Actions by direct–affect groups always have
the ecosystem as one of the targets of an output
action. When such an action message is read by
the ecosystem ID, its effect on the ecosystem is
computed. If the action does not affect the ecosys-
tem, e.g. a riot by the rural residents of Kenya, then
the ecosystem model computes no effect on the
ecosystem due to this action.
Target, output action pair effectiveness
The militaristic or economic effectiveness of an
output action is determined in–part by its target. To
represent this interaction, Scenario nodes are
needed to represent the DM_group’s perception of
the militaristic effectiveness of a target, output ac-
tion pair given an input actor, input action pair. The
nodes MilEf and EconEf take on the values nega-
tive effect, no effect, and positive effect and are
influenced by Input Actor, Input Action, Target, and
Output Action nodes. MilEf influences the Scenario
Maintain Order goal, and EconEf influences Sce-
nario Immediate Economic Resources Change.
Group ID hypothesis value assignment
In the Results section, below, Consistency Analysis
(CA) is used to fit each ID’s parameters to data. CA
requires that each parameter in an ID be assigned
an a–priori point value derived from expert opinion
and/or subject matter theory. Let  H
(j) be such a
value assigned to an ID’s jth parameter. Collect all
of these hypothesis parameter values into the hy-
pothesis parameter vector,   H. See the Results
section, below and Haas (2001, Appendix) for fur-
ther discussion of CA.
Because of the complexity of each group’s ID, it
is difficult to directly assign hypothesis parameter
values. For this reason, two optimization steps are
performed to find hypothesis values that reflect the
information contained in two types of hypothetical
data sets. The first of these data sets is a collection
of pairs of input and output node values on the
group ID. Call this nontemporal data set an action–
reaction data set. The second data set consists of a
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model. Call this temporally–indexed data set an
actions history data set. The action–reaction data
set is used in an optimization procedure to find an
initial  H. The actions history data set is used by a
second optimization procedure to refine these initial
values. These two optimization steps are described
in Haas (2003a, Section 2).
Results
Example: cheetah in Kenya
Background
Cheetah preservation is a prominent example of the
difficulties surrounding the preservation of a large
land mammal whose range extends over several
countries. The main threats to cheetah preservation
are loss of habitat, cub predation by other carni-
vores, and poaching (Gros, 1998; Kelly & Durant,
2000). Kelly & Durant (2000) note that juvenile
survival is reduced by lion predation inside reserves
because these reserves are not big enough for
cheetah to find areas uninhabited by lions. Over
crowding of reserves in Africa is widespread (see
O’Connell–Rodwell et al., 2000) and cheetah do not
compete well for space with other carnivores (Kelly
& Durant, 2000). Gibson (1999, p. 122) finds that
the three reasons for poaching are the need for
meat, the need for cash from selling animal "tro-
phies", and the need to protect livestock.
All input and output files for this example along
with the EMS JavaTM based software is available at
www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/.
ID descriptions
According to Gros (1998) and Gibson (1999, p.
164), the groups that directly affect the cheetah
population are ranchers, rural residents, and
pastoralists. Presidents, Environmental Protection
Agencies (EPAs), legislatures, and courts indirectly
affect the cheetah through their influence on these
t0 action
messages
t0 action
messages
t1 action
messages
t1 action
messages
t1 action
messages
t2 action
messages
ID1
ID2
         t1     t1         t2   t2
Fig. 2. Sequential updating scheme of an IntIDs model consisting of two IDs. Bulletin board states are
indicated by the boxes in the top row. A dashed arrow indicates messages are read but not removed.
A solid arrow indicates message addition.
Fig. 2. Esquema secuencial de actualización de un modelo de IntIDs (diagramas de influencia
interactivos) que consta de dos IDs (diagramas de influencia). Los diferentes estados del tablón de
anuncios se indican mediante los recuadros situados en la fila superior. Una flecha discontinua indica
que los mensajes se han leído, pero no han sido eliminados. Una flecha continua indica la adición de
mensajes.238 Haas
direct–affect groups. In this EMS model, group IDs
are constructed to represent the president of Kenya,
the Kenyan EPA, Kenyan rural residents, and Ken-
yan pastoralists. These group IDs interact with
each other and an ID of the cheetah–supporting
ecosystem contained within Kenya.
Hypothesis parameter values for each ID in the
EMS model are available at the aforementioned
cheetah EMS website under the Current EMS Re-
port link. Abbreviations used below are: Pres. presi-
dent; EPA. Environmental Protection Agency; RR.
Rural residents; Pas. Pastoralists; and Eco. Eco-
system. The ecosystem is directly affected only by
poaching activities and land clearing. Anti–poach-
ing enforcement is directed against either the rural
residents or pastoralists and may or may not be
effective at reducing poaching activity. Likewise,
the creation of a preserve or the opening of an
existing preserve to settlement are actions directed
against the rural residents and/or pastoralists.
In what follows, each group ID is described and
hypothetical action–reaction data sets (tables 1–4)
are given that are used to compute each group’s
initial  H vector (Haa 2003a, Section 2). The heuris-
tics listed in www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/
heuristics.pdf are used to represent subject matter
theory during the first step of this computation.
Gibson (1999, pp. 155–156) argues in his case
studies of Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe that the
president in each of these countries has a different
personal priority for protecting ecosystems. Further,
presidents of politically unstable countries typically
place a high priority on protecting their power and
staying in office (Gibson 1999, p. 7). These insights
have motivated the following president ID (see
www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/kenpres.pdf).
The president has direct knowledge of rural resi-
dent and pastoralist actions. The president receives
ecosystem status information exclusively from the
EPA. The president’s audiences are campaign do-
nors and the military. The president’s goals are to
maintain political power and domestic order. The
president’s action repertoire is: no changes, create
a preserve, request increased antipoaching en-
forcement, open a preserve to settlement, and
suppress a riot.
EPA perceptions of the ecosystem’s status are
represented by the cheetah prevalence and herbiv-
ore prevalence nodes. These nodes are influenced
by the values of cheetah density, herbivore density,
and poaching rate in the ecosystem ID. The EPA’s
sole audience is the president. The EPA’s goals are
to protect the environment, and to increase the
agency’s staff and budget. The latter goal is moti-
vated by an examination of the literature on bu-
reaucracies. The main postulates of this literature
are concisely stated by Ott (1981):
"Managers of public enterprises —e.g. municipal
fire departments, public hospitals, the Department
of the Interior— have incentive structures much
different from their private counterparts. In a private
firm the owners create incentives for managers to
maximize the difference between revenues and pri-
vate costs. Since the private manager has some
contingent property rights in the revenue–minus–
cost residual, he makes choices that tend to maxi-
mize the firm’s and its owners’net worth.
Conversely, in the public sector there is no re-
sidual claimant: The public agency’s budget must
be exhausted by approved expenditures. If there is
a surplus, it is remanded to the general fund and
will usually result in a reduction of the agency’s
subsequent budgets. Since a surplus cannot ben-
efit the agency, there can be no direct benefit to the
agency of increasing a benefit–cost difference or of
reducing the cost of achieving a given benefit level.
Thus, broadly speaking, bureaucrats have strong
incentives to increase costs, as these will, up to a
point, increase the size of the bureau’s budget. This
budget augmentation can be accomplished in one
or both of two ways: (1) by under–stating the
marginal cost of the bureau’s output; (2) by price
discrimination.
If we assume that managers of public agencies
are wealth maximizers to the same extent as man-
agers of private firms, then their behavior —i.e., their
budgeting decisions, their planning, and their pro-
duction— can be understood in terms of the reward
structure under which they function. The pecuniary
compensation of civil service managers is deter-
mined, somewhat rigidly and quite uniformly, by the
number and grade of people whom they supervise;
thus there is a strong incentive for bureaucrats at
each level in an agency to increase the number of
employees in their sections. By so doing, their oper-
ating budgets and salaries will be enlarged.
The bureaucrat’s decision problem is, therefore, to
present the largest budget that his political executive
—the mayor, the governor, or the cabinet secretary—
would approve. This entails knowing the executive’s
demand for the agency’s output as well as knowing
the agency’s own cost function. Knowledge of the
latter is a qualification for management and comes
from the seniority characteristic of civil servants who
head agencies. Knowledge of the former is obtained
as a result of the political process. A political candi-
date reveals his preferences both explicitly in his
campaign platform and implicitly by embodying the
preferences of those voter and special–interest groups
who support him. Since department heads and cabi-
net secretaries are appointees of the elected politi-
cian, these political executives may, in turn, be pre-
sumed to reflect the preferences of the politician''.
See also Niskanen (1971). For example, Healy &
Ascher (1995) note that during the 1970’s and 1980’s
the USDA Forest Service, using FORPLAN output,
consistently proposed forest management plans that
required large increases in Forest Service budget
and staff (see also Gibson 1999, pp. 85, 115–116).
Possible actions by the EPA are: decrease
antipoaching enforcement, maintain antipoaching
enforcement, and increase antipoaching enforce-
ment (see www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/
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The development of both the rural resident, and
pastoralist IDs, below is derived from the study of
these two groups by Gibson (1999, pp. 121–123,
143–147) and is an attempt to represent quantita-
tively the goals, audiences, and action repertoire of
these two groups as described by that author.
Herbivore prevalence as influenced by the herbiv-
ore density node is the single ecosystem status node
for the rural resident ID. A rural resident is pursuing
the two goals supporting his/her family, and avoiding
prosecution for poaching herbivores and/or chee-
tahs. Possible rural resident actions are: little poach-
ing, moderate poaching, heavy poaching, clear new
land, and riot (see www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-chee-
tah/kenrr.pdf). The action little poaching includes the
action of no poaching.
This version of the rural resident ID does not
distinguish between poaching herbivores versus
cheetahs. There is evidence that poaching activ-
ity tends to include both herbivores and carni-
vores (Gibson 1999, pp. 143–145). In the eco-
system ID, a poaching action modifies the her-
bivore count stochastic differential equation (SDE)
and the cheetah death rate SDE (see below). A
change in the area of protected regions affects
the herbivore SDE and the cheetah birth rate
SDE. Hence, a poaching action’s affect on the
ecosystem model is interpreted as the poaching
of both herbivores and cheetahs. Future versions
of this EMS model will have separate group ac-
tions for the frequency of poaching herbivores for
meat, and the frequency of poaching cheetahs for
either trophies or to protect livestock. Such differ-
entiation will also allow the indirect effect on the
ecosystem of herbivore poaching causing a re-
duction in cheetah carrying capacity.
Hunting big cats for trophies is market–driven and
this world–wide market is not represented in either
the rural resident or pastoralist IDs. The effect of this
omission is that the model assumes a constant
demand or constant market price for trophies. One
way to model this demand–side effect on the motiva-
tion of rural residents and/or pastoralists to poach
cheetahs is to develop a group ID of the buyers of
such trophies. As a result of world–wide efforts to
reduce the demand for trophies, this group would
post lower market prices for trophies to the IntIDs
bulletin board. These posted prices would, in–turn
affect the perceived profit by rural residents and/or
pastoralists from poaching cheetahs. This approach
will be experimented with in future versions of this
cheetah management EMS.
Cheetah prevalence as influenced by cheetah
density is the single ecosystem status node in the
pastoralist ID. Pastoralists have the three goals of
supporting their family, protecting their livestock,
Table 1. Hypothetical action–reaction data for the Kenya president ID: inac. Input actor; c(in). Input
action;  s(in).  Input subject; c(ou).  Output action; Target. Output action subject; Pas. Pastoralist; RR.
Rural residents; EPA. Environmental Protection Agency; Eco. Ecosystem; Self. DM_group
Tabla 1. Datos hipotéticos de acción–reacción con respecto a los diagramas de influencia del presidente
de Kenia ID: inac. Actor de la acción estímulo; c(in). Acción estímulo; s(in). Sujeto estímulo; c(ou). Acción
resultado; Target. Sujeto que recibe el resultado (el objetivo); Pas. Ganaderos; RR. Residentes rurales;
EPA. Agencia de Protección del Medio Ambiente; Eco. Ecosistema; Self. Grupo DM.
 Input vector              Output vector    
inac c(in) s(in) c(ou) Target
Pas little poaching Eco do nothing Pas
Pas moderate poaching Eco request increased EPA
     antipoaching  enforcement  
Pas heavy poaching Self request increased EPA
     antipoaching  enforcement  
RR little poaching Eco do nothing RR
RR moderate poaching Eco request increased EPA
     antipoaching  enforcement  
RR heavy poaching Self open preserve RR
RR clear new land Eco do nothing RR
RR riot Self suppress riot RR
EPA negative ecoreport Self create preserve Pas
EPA positive ecoreport Self do nothing EPA240 Haas
and avoiding prosecution for poaching. Possible
pastoralist actions are: little poaching, moderate
poaching, and heavy poaching (see www.uwm.edu/
-haas/ems-cheetah/kenpas.pdf). As with the rural
residents, a poaching action does not differentiate
between the taking of herbivores versus cheetahs.
The ecosystem ID is a modified version of the
cheetah population dynamics ID of Haas (2001) and
consists of four subIDs: management, habitat, direct
effects on population dynamics, and population dy-
namics (see www.uwm.edu/-haas/ems-cheetah/
ecosys.pdf). Management nodes represent time (t),
region (q), and management options (m). Cheetah
habitat is characterized by chance nodes for the
region’s climate (CL), unprotected land use (U), and
the proportion of a region’s area that is protected
(Rt). A single direct effect chance node follows:
within–region poaching pressure (Pt). The node U
takes on the values nomad_camel, nomad_cattle,
ranching, and farming.
Cheetah population dynamics is modeled with a
system of SDEs consisting of the within–region
nodes of birth rate (ft), death rate (rt), number of
herbivores (Ht), cheetah carrying capacity (Kt), and
cheetah count (Nt).
The SDE for Ht is
      (1)
where  H0 is the initial count,  0  (10,000)  is the
carrying capacity of the habitat (influenced by CL),
 1  is the difference between herbivore birth and
death rates,   (= 0.01) is the diffusion parameter,
and Wt is a Wiener process. The initial value, H0 is
set to 0.6 0. This model is a simplified version of
the relationship given in Wells et al. (1998) wherein
the probability of offspring upon the meeting of a
male and female is assumed to be 1.0.
Poaching affects the value of  1: minor poach-
ing,  moderate poaching, and severe poaching
cause  1 to take on the values 0.1, –0.1, and –0.3,
respectively. If E[Ht] < 2,000, the rural resident
ID’s Herbivores node is set to none, if
2000< E[Ht] < 10,000, this node is set to few, and if
10,000 < E[Ht], this node is set to many.
As described in Haas (2001), the distribution of
cheetah birth rate, ft is the solution of the SDE
                (2)
Table 2. Hypothetical action–reaction data for the Kenya EPA ID. (For abbreviations see table 1.)
Tabla 2. Datos hipotéticos de acción–reacción con respecto a los diagramas de influencia de la
Agencia de Protección del Medioambiente de Kenia. (Para las abreviaturas ver tabla 1.)
    Input vector          Output vector  
inac  c(in)     s(in)        c(ou)           Target
Pas heavy poaching Eco increase antipoach Pas
RR clear new land Eco negative ecoreport Pres
Pres request increased Self increase antipoach RR
 antipoaching      
 enforcement
    
Table 3. Hypothetical action–reaction data for the Kenya rural resident ID. (For abbreviations see
table 1.)
Tabla 3. Datos hipotéticos de acción–reacción con respecto a los diagramas de influencia de los
residentes rurales de Kenia. (Para las abreviaturas ver tabla 1.)
     Input vector                  Output vector  
inac c(in) s(in) c(ou) Target
EPA increase antipoach Self moderate poaching Eco
Pres open preserve Self clear new land Eco
Pres create preserve Self heavy poaching EcoAnimal Biodiversity and Conservation 27.1 (2004) 241
where ft
’ = 2ft – 1. This SDE was chosen because its
solution is bounded between 0 and 1 making ft a
well–defined birth rate ft c ( 0, 1). A similar develop-
ment for cheetah death rate gives
        (3)
where  rt
’ = 2rt – 1. Note that the birth rate de-
creases as  f becomes increasingly positive, and
the death rate decreases as  r becomes increas-
ingly positive.
The tendency of more females to have lit-
ters within protected areas (see Gros, 1998) is
represented by having the parameter  f be
conditional on the region’s status. Similarly, to
represent the effect of poaching and pest hunt-
ing on rt,  r is conditional on poaching pres-
sure. The variability of the sample paths of ft
and rt are controlled by the parameters  f and
 r, respectively.
All other unmodeled effects (such as migration,
emigration, or age–dependent parameter values)
that could influence the within–region cheetah count
differential (dNt) are represented by the noise term
in the cheetah count SDE:
        (4)
were P, c, N0, and  N are fixed parameters, and Kt
is a deterministic function of the Ht temporal
stochastic process.
Future versions of this cheetah count model will
include terms to represent cheetah migration and
emigration between adjacent regions including re-
gions that are within the neighboring countries of
Tanzania and Uganda.
As mentioned above, the effect of climate change
on a region is represented by the ecosystem’s
climate node (CL) that influences herbivore carry-
ing capacity.
Ecosystem status output nodes are herbivore
and cheetah densities. Because the ecosystem ID
is conditional on region, computed herbivore and
cheetah densities are region–specific. Since the
group IDs are not regionally–indexed, these re-
gion–specific ecosystem ID outputs need to be
aggregated across regions. Here, this aggregation
is accomplished by computing at each time step, a
weighted average of the expected values of ecosys-
tem output nodes with region area as the weighting
variable. These weighted averages are written to
the bulletin board.
Hypothesis parameter values for this ecosystem
ID are taken from Haas (2001).
Example model output
As an example of EMS model output, figure 3
gives the event history over a three year period
computed by the IntIDs EMS model using each
ID’s   H values. Three months is the unit of time
(expressed in units of years, i.e., groups read the
bulletin board every 0.25 time units). The initializ-
ing action is RRs clearing new land. This action
prompts a negative ecosystem status report by the
EPA. Upon receipt of this report, the president
calls for increased antipoaching enforcement (Time
= 2000.5) and so forth.
The figure indicates a steady decline in both
herbivore and cheetah density across Kenya.
Say that preservation measures were enacted in
2001 and maintained through 2002. What
changes in parameter values would be needed
to reverse these declines? Through trial and
error it has been found that the difference in
herbivore birth and death rates would need to be
maintained at 0.5, the cheetah birth rate param-
eter,   f at –3.0, and the cheetah death rate
parameter,  r at 3.0.
Because a fixed time step is used, the EMS
model may produce a frequency of actions from
a group that may be higher than observed. For
the case of an action being repeated —such as
the president’s call for increased antipoaching
enforcement in the example, the repeated ac-
tion should be interpreted as the group’s con-
tinued preferred response which in reality may
not be made public at time points following the
first time that the action is posted on the bulle-
tin board.
Table 4. Hypothetical action–reaction data for the Kenya pastoralist ID. (For abbreviations see table 1.)
Tabla 4. Datos hipotéticos de acción–reacción con respecto a los diagramas de influencia de los
ganaderos de Kenia. (Para las abreviaturas ver tabla 1.)
Input  vector Output  vector   
inac c(in) s(in) c(ou) Target
EPA increase antipoach Self moderate poaching Eco, EPA
Pres create preserve Self heavy poaching Pres, Eco
EPA decrease antipoaching Self moderate poaching Eco, EPA242 Haas
Parameter estimation with CA
CA overview
CA is used to fit the EMS model to data. Let U be an
IntID’s  r–dimensional vector of chance nodes. Let
gS( ) be a goodness–of–fit statistic that measures
the agreement of this distribution (referred to here as
the Ux  distribution) and the (possibly) incomplete
sample, S. Let gH( ) be the agreement between this
distribution identified by the values of  H (referred to
here as the hypothesis distribution) and the U* 
distribution. Let gsmax be the unconstrained maxi-
mum value of gS( ) over all  . Let ghmax be the
unconstrained maximum value of gH( ) over all  . Up
to errors in the approximation of gH( ),  ghmax =
gH( H). The CA parameter estimator maximizes
 gCA( ) h (1 – cH) gs( )/*gsmax*+ cHgH( ) /*ghmax*
were cH c (0, 1) is the analyst’s priority of having
the consistent distribution agree with the hypoth-
esis distribution as opposed to agreeing with the
empirical (data–based) distribution. Let                 
h argmax  {gCA( )} be the CA estimate of  . See
Haas (2001, Appendix) for further details and a
comparison with other parameter estimators, and
Haas (2003a, Section 5) for mathematical defini-
tions of all CA agreement functions.
CA example
The actions history–ecosystem status output (fig. 3) is
used to illustrate CA. A smaller number of Monte Carlo
realizations per ID causes the IntIDs model output to
deviate slightly from the output of figure 3 and hence
can be used as a data set that is different than the EMS
model output under the IntID’s hypothesis distributions.
The parameters estimated with CA are those
defining the president’s Overall Goal Satisfaction
node, and the ecosystem ID’s cheetah count node
—resulting in 12 parameters to be estimated. For
cH set to 0.5, starting and ending values of each
CA agreement function are in table 5. Values of
gsmax and ghmax are 23.6962 and 1.2671, re-
spectively. The CA optimization was limited to 200
function evaluations per step and hence did not
achieve convergence on either step. This run re-
quired four hours on a 500 mhz PC. Table 5
indicates that significant improvements in model
fit to a data set can be achieved after only a
modest exploration of the parameter space.
One–step–ahead prediction error rates are given
in Haas (2003a, Section 5). Also, a parameter sen-
sitivity analysis of this model shows no highly unsta-
ble parameters (see Haas, 2003a, Section 4).
Discussion
A general purpose EMS has been developed that
can help decision makers manage an ecosystem
while taking into account political realities. Methods
have also been developed for fitting the EMS model
to a history of group actions and ecosystem obser-
vations.
This group actions and ecosystem observa-
tions data set can be augmented with actions
directed towards similar environmental metrics.
For example, management decisions concerning
any large land carnivore such as lions can be
included in the data set used to estimate the
parameters of the example’s cheetah manage-
ment EMS model.
Modeling across multiple scales
Group behavior across a range of spatial scales is
captured in the IntIDs EMS model structure by
using a separate suite of group IDs for each coun-
try. Different temporal scales are modeled with
selection of values for the time step between bulle-
tin board updates in relation to the values chosen
for the wildlife population dynamics model’s diffu-
sion rate parameters. Ecosystem behavior across a
range of spatial scales is captured thru the use of
an ecosystem model at the level of a homogeneous
region – similar to an ecoregion.
A current shortcoming of the cheetah manage-
ment model is that the population dynamics mod-
el’s diffusion rate parameters are too fast. This was
done to illustrate how the ecosystem model could
interact with several group models.
Descriptions of related approaches
Post–normal science
In their development of post–normal science,
Funtowicz & Ravetz (1993) argue that: (a) models as
normally understood by scientists are not going to
be successful in capturing the behavior of complex
environmental systems, (b) diverse groups have
Table 5. CA agreement function values using
artificial data: Am. Agreement measure; Pi.
Percent improvement.
Table 5. Valores de la función de concordancia
del análisis de consistencia utilizando datos
artificiales: Am. Medida de concordancia; Pi.
Porcentaje de mejora.
Am   =  H   =  C Pi
gS
Eco( ) –1.9146 1.5273 179
gS
Grp( ) 18.049 20.2800 12
gH
Eco( ) –1.2657 –.00035 100
gH
Grp ( ) –.0014 –.00164 –17
gCA
 ( ) –.3191 .4594 244Animal Biodiversity and Conservation 27.1 (2004) 243
stakes in the outcomes of these systems and attach
different values to such outcomes, (c) many of these
groups are not members of established policymaking
or scientific elites but nonetheless are demanding
and receiving a significant role in the management
of such complex environmental systems, so that (d)
future management decisions should be made on
"partial" scientific analysis and shared decision mak-
ing that respects the values of groups that have been
historically marginalized in policymaking debates.
Fig. 3. Output action time series under  H values. An arrow’s tail locates a group’s action and the
arrow’s head indicates the reaction of either a group or the ecosystem. Each line on an ecosystem
variable plot is the mean for one of the eleven regions in Kenya.
Fig. 3. Serie temporal de los resultados de las acciones según los valores  H. La cola de una flecha
sitúa la acción de un grupo, mientras que su cabeza indica la reacción de un grupo o del ecosistema.
Cada línea que figura en la representación gráfica variable del ecosistema corresponde al promedio de
una de las once regiones de Kenia.
Kenpres suppress riot
open preserve
req incr antip
create preserve
no changes
Kenepa positive ecoreport
negative ecoreport
increase antipoach
decrease antipoach
no changes
Kenrr riot
clear new land
heavy poaching
moderate poaching
litte poaching
abandon settlement
Kenpas heavy poaching
moderate poaching
little poaching
Cheetah density 0.0426
0.0322
0.0218
0.0114
0.0010
Herbivore density 0.5977
0.4548
0.3118
0.1688
0.0258
The ID–based, combined political and ecologi-
cal processes EMS model proposed here is simi-
lar to the post–normal science agenda in that it
explicitly models the values and decision making
processes of all groups affecting the environmen-
tal system. System complexity however, contrary
to the post–normal science view, is not seen as
hopeless to model but rather, stochastic models
are proposed that, after being fitted to data, can
have their out–of–sample or predictive validity
2000.0 2000.2 2000.5 2000.7 2001.0 2001.2 2001.5 2001.7 2002.0
Time
Model–Computed Actions History244 Haas
demonstrated. Such demonstrations can lead to
greater impact of the output of such models on the
policymaking debate.
Multiagent models
Janssen (2002) describes a multi–agent simulation
model of forest harvesting decisions of landowners
in southern Indiana (U.S.A.), and in the Brazilian
Amazon. This model employs finite–difference equa-
tions to represent farmers using a simple learning
algorithm and a simple maximum expected utility
decision making algorithm to reach harvesting de-
cisions. For example, a decision to harvest trees is
made if current economic conditions result in the
utility of a harvesting proposal to be greater than
that of not harvesting.
This approach to a model–based EMS is differ-
ent from the approach described in this article in
that: (a) a procedure has not been given for fitting
the model to landowner behavior observations, (b)
the group behavior model is relatively simple, and
(c) there is no separate ecosystem model.
Differential and finite difference equation models
Costanza et al. (2001) has developed a simulation
model of the dynamic characteristics of humans
interacting with periodically harvested fish stocks.
This model accounts for different spatial and tem-
poral scales of social and ecological processes. For
example, mis–perceived spatial scale of fish
populations can lead to extinction because the
regulatory region scale and the natural population
scale are different. For the case of northern Atlantic
fisheries, the U.S. claim to regulatory control for up
to 200 miles offshore results in a large–area fishing
quota being set —but population spawning grounds
are small and separated areas. Implementation of
such quotas then, can lead to local population
depletion.
In this model, groups obey simple rules of
behavior such as harvesting to maintain a maxi-
mum sustained yield, or unlimited fishing. Fish
stocks are affected by: (a) harvesting and value–
addition by humans before human consumption,
(b) fishing regulation limits, (c) cheating (catches
are over regulation limits), and (d) spatially hetero-
geneous area (three subregions).
This approach to a model–based EMS is differ-
ent from the approach described in this article in
that: (a) there are no stochastic terms, (b) a proce-
dure has not been given for fitting the model to
fisheries observations, (c) the group behavior model
is relatively simple, and (d) there is no separate
ecosystem model.
Carpenter et al. (1999) describes a model of
multiple agents affecting a lake’s nutrient loading.
A stochastic finite difference equation model of a
lake’s phosphorous load along with a soils equa-
tion makes up the environmental model. Simple,
deterministic, utility maximizing equations are used
to represent the decision making of scientists,
economists, regulators, and farmers. Two compu-
tations are made at each time step. First, each
agent decides how much phosphorous to allow
into the lake. This is done by modeling these
agents as utility maximizers having only partial
information access. Then, the soils and lake mod-
els are updated.
This approach to a model–based EMS is differ-
ent from the approach described in this article in
that: (a) no procedure has been given for fitting the
model to observations on soils and lake status, (b)
group behavior models assume high education lev-
els and the ability to make fairly precise economic
calculations, and (c) multiple spatial scales are not
represented.
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